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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Theory  of mind  (ToM)  is  a core topic  in both  social  neuroscience  and  developmental  psy-
chology,  yet  theory  and  data  from  each  ﬁeld  have  only  minimally  constrained  thinking  in
the other.  The  two ﬁelds  might  be fruitfully  integrated,  however,  if social  neuroscientists
sought  evidence  directly  relevant  to current  accounts  of ToM  development:  modularity,
simulation,  executive,  and  theory  theory  accounts.  Here  we extend  the  distinct  predic-
tions made  by each  theory  to  the  neural  level,  describe  neuroimaging  evidence  that  inTheory of mind
Neuroimaging
Modularity
Theory  theory
Simulation
Executive functioning
principle  would  be relevant  to  testing  each  account,  and  discuss  such  evidence  where  it
exists. We  propose  that  it would  be  mutually  beneﬁcial  for both  ﬁelds  if  ToM  neuroimag-
ing  studies  focused  more  on  integrating  developmental  accounts  of  ToM  acquisition  with
neuroimaging  approaches,  and  suggest  ways  this  might  be  achieved.
© 2014  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Contents
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. Introduction
As the ﬁeld of psychology diversiﬁes, communication
mong researchers who study the same topic with different
ethodologies becomes increasingly important. Empiri-
al  ﬁndings are disseminated within a certain theoretical
r  methodological framework, potentially creating gaps
etween  literatures that may  not be bridged. Such is the
urrent state of theory of mind (ToM) research, where
here is little overlap in how developmental psychologists
nd social neuroscientists study the ways in which people
mpute mental states to self and other.
Social neuroscience and developmental psychology
oth prominently feature research on ToM, yet empha-
ize  different facets of this core social cognitive ability.
ocial neuroscientists tend to focus on where in the brain
entalizing resides, while developmental psychologists
re centrally concerned with how mentalizing is acquired
and when it emerges). As a result, much of the adult
euroimaging work has not been explicitly linked to devel-
pmental theories; instead, it has focused on identifying
oM-relevant neural regions, and distinguishing groups of
ndividuals  such as those with and without autism spec-
rum  disorders in terms of systems or processes recruited.
he differing research agendas of these two ﬁelds are
learly related and yet, as others have noted (e.g., Apperly,
008; Saxe, 2006), they remain largely unreconciled.
In this paper we aim to advance the ﬁeld by attempting
o integrate developmental and neuroimaging approaches
o  ToM. We propose that it would be mutually beneﬁcial
or both ﬁelds if developmental and social neuroscientists
ere to more fully consider developmental theories focus-
ng  on acquisition of ToM when generating hypotheses,
esigning studies, and interpreting results. Our review is
he  ﬁrst to examine in one place neural evidence for the four
ajor  theories of ToM acquisition that have been proposed,
lthough others have compared subsets of the theories
e.g., Apperly, 2008; Wilkinson and Ball, 2012). We  take
he  position that processes speciﬁed by each theory may
otentially contribute to ToM development and that ulti-
ately  neuroimaging research may  help generate a new
heory  that integrates existing approaches. Our primary
oal  is to compile an up-to-date summary of neuroimaging
vidence relevant to theoretical accounts of ToM acquisi-
ion  so that this growing ﬁeld may  advance conceptually,
heoretically, and methodologically. Further, we hope to
stablish  where neuroimaging techniques might be partic-
larly  helpful or unhelpful in testing a given theory. It is our. . . .  . .  .  .  . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . .  . . . .  . . .  . . . . . . . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . . . . 78
hope  that both behavioral and neuroimaging researchers
will ﬁnd this review useful and that it will stimulate
future work integrating developmental and neuroimaging
approaches.
We  begin by brieﬂy reviewing the main theoretical
accounts of how ToM is acquired and suggesting the types
of  neural evidence that would support or pose problems for
each  theory, describing such evidence where it is available.
We  consider the following four development accounts of
ToM:  modularity theories, simulation theories, executive
accounts, and theory theory. We  draw on developmen-
tal evidence whenever possible although the current state
of  the literature dictates a heavy reliance on ﬁndings
from adult studies, as neuroimaging studies with children
remain scarce. We  also draw on the autism literature to the
extent  it is strongly germane to our argument, although
a  full consideration of that literature is beyond the scope
of  the current paper (see Happé and Frith, 2013 for a
review of neuroimaging studies in ASD). Finally, we  address
some  of the challenges of using neuroimaging techniques
to  examine developmental theories of ToM and suggest
future research that could close the gap between social
neuroscience and developmental approaches.
2. Modularity theories: selectivity
2.1. Deﬁnition
Modularity theories (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Leslie et al., 2004;
Scholl and Leslie, 1999; Baron-Cohen, 1995, 1998) postu-
late  that ToM development is driven by an innate neural
mechanism dedicated to mental state reasoning. Although
experience may  be important in triggering this mechanism,
it  cannot revise the mechanism’s basic nature. Leslie and
his  colleagues have proposed the most fully articulated
and prominent modularity theory of ToM and therefore we
focus  on their account. It should be noted, however, that
their  account represents a relatively strong form of mod-
ularity  and that accounts stipulating less stringent criteria
have  been proposed (e.g., see Coltheart, 1999; Carruthers,
2003). The central claims made by Leslie and colleagues are
that  an innate ToM module (ToMM)  is working by the sec-
ond  year of life, and that later age-related improvements in
ToM  performance in childhood are driven by an inhibitory
selection process that becomes increasingly able to handle
the  executive demands of ToM tasks (Leslie et al., 2004;
Scholl and Leslie, 2001; German and Hehman, 2006).
l Cognit70 C.E.V. Mahy et al. / Developmenta
2.2. Criteria
An  early developing ToMM is consistent with ﬁndings
from studies suggesting that even infants may  be capable
of  at least some mental state inferences (e.g., Baillargeon
et al., 2010; Kovacs et al., 2010; Onishi and Baillargeon,
2005), while the proposed selection process may  account
for  performance improvements in explicit, verbal ToM
tasks  commonly used with preschoolers (e.g., false belief
tasks;  Leslie and Polizzi, 1998). Convincingly demonstrat-
ing modularity, however, is anything but straightforward.
Domain speciﬁcity, obligatory ﬁring, rapid speed of pro-
cessing,  constrained output, dedicated neural architecture,
and a characteristic pattern of breakdown are typically
associated with modular processing (Baron-Cohen, 1994;
Coltheart, 1999; Fodor, 1983; Baldwin and Moses, 1994;
Scholl  and Leslie, 1999). Given these stringent criteria,
Leslie et al.’s modularity theory is perhaps the most fal-
siﬁable of all the ToM accounts.
Neuroimaging  evidence is particularly useful in test-
ing  this theory as clear predictions can be generated from
the  purported existence and developmental maturation of
a  ToMM.  First, to support modularity, a particular brain
region, or network of brain regions, would need to be con-
sistently  activated whenever individuals engage in mental
state  reasoning. Second, this pattern of activation would
need  to be present not only early in development but
throughout the lifespan. Recruitment of the neural network
could  be modulated by experience, but the same set of neu-
ral  regions should be consistently engaged at all points in
development. For example, evidence of early ToM compe-
tence  in infancy would more strongly support a modularity
account, if infants in fact recruit similar neural regions as
adults  when mentalizing. Third, to satisfy the dedicated
neural architecture criterion, the neural network would
also  need to be selectively recruited for ToM reasoning. If
the  neural system responsible for mental state reasoning is
not  selective, or only becomes selective to mental states
late  in childhood or in adulthood, that would challenge
the modularity account. Finally, if Leslie et al.’s (2004) con-
ception  of an inhibitory process is correct, developmental
improvements in ToM during the preschool period should
be  associated with a neural region related to an inhibitory
selection process rather than with a neural region related
to  ToM.
2.3. Evidence
Consistent with modularity accounts, a common neu-
ral  network involved in adults’ mental state reasoning
has been established, although the components of the
network vary to some extent from study to study. Brain
regions most typically implicated include (a) cortical mid-
line  structures (CMS) comprised of the medial prefrontal
cortex (MPFC), adjacent rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex  (rACC), and medial posterior parietal cortices (MPPC)
including posterior cingulate and precuneus (Amodio and
Frith,  2006; Mitchell et al., 2005; Ochsner et al., 2005), and
(b)  the bilateral temporal parietal junction (TPJ; Saxe, 2009;
Young  et al., 2010a).ive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81
Because  the CMS  also support abilities such as integra-
tion and prospection (e.g., Spreng et al., 2009; Spreng and
Grady,  2010), and hence do not respond selectively to ToM
input,  these structures do not qualify as a ToMM.  However,
the  TPJ appears to be a stronger candidate for a ToMM
as  some evidence suggests that, unlike the CMS, it may
selectively respond to mental state information (Saxe et al.,
2009;  Samson et al., 2004).
Early  neuroimaging studies found that bilateral TPJ was
recruited during mental state reasoning in adults (Saxe
and  Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe and Powell, 2006). Appropri-
ate  comparison conditions with respect to selectivity are
key  to the TPJ as ToMM argument. For example, Saxe
and Kanwisher (2003) found that the bilateral TPJ was
recruited more heavily when participants listened to sto-
ries  about characters’ mental states compared to stories
about characters’ physical descriptions in otherwise iden-
tical  formats (see also Saxe et al., 2009). Further, Saxe and
Powell  (2006) found that bilateral TPJ and posterior cin-
gulate  were recruited during stories about a protagonist’s
thoughts but not during stories about a protagonist’s non-
mental  internal states such as bodily sensations or physical
attributes such as appearance.
In  recent years the right TPJ has received particular
scrutiny as it appears to be more responsive to thinking
about mental states than the left TPJ (Dohnel et al., 2012;
Saxe,  2010), although some have argued the left TPJ is
also  necessary for representing others’ beliefs (e.g., Samson
et  al., 2004). Some evidence in favor of a special role for the
right  TPJ comes from an EEG/ERP investigation with adults,
in  which belief reasoning recruited right posterior neural
systems (Liu et al., 2009). In addition, speciﬁcally disrupt-
ing  the functioning of right TPJ using transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) has been found to increase participants’
difﬁculty in using mental state information in moral judg-
ments  (Young et al., 2010b). More recently, Dohnel et al.
(2012)  also found that the right TPJ was activated in both
true  and false belief reasoning in adults. Taken together,
studies with adults such as these support the argument that
the  TPJ, and the right TPJ in particular, may  be selective for
mental  state reasoning and may  therefore be a plausible
candidate for a ToMM.
As  noted earlier, however, TPJ should also demonstrate
similarly selective properties in children and adolescents
in  order to qualify as a ToMM.  Here the evidence is not as
strongly supportive of modularity. Although 8–12-year-old
children signiﬁcantly engage TPJ bilaterally in ToM stories
that  require second-order false belief reasoning compared
to  a non-ToM control story (Kobayashi et al., 2007), younger
children do not always show this selective TPJ recruitment.
For instance, in a sample of 6–11-year-olds, the younger
children showed a lack of selective TPJ recruitment during
ToM  reasoning compared to more general social reason-
ing  (Saxe et al., 2009). These children recruited right TPJ
equally for mental and physical facts about people, whereas
the  older children engaged right TPJ only for mental facts.
Relatedly, Gweon et al. (2013) found increasing selectiv-
ity  to mental state information with age in TPJ bilaterally
in  a sample of 5–11-year-olds. Overall, this region appears
to  become increasingly selective for mental state informa-
tion  during development. Such a developmental trajectory
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oses a problem for current modularity theories that are
ased  on the assumption that a selective ToMM is in place
uch  earlier in life.
Moreover,  even in adults, tasks unrelated to ToM rea-
oning also appear to recruit TPJ, again violating the
peciﬁcity criterion. Sabbagh (2011) has suggested that
ight  TPJ may  be ‘shared real estate’ supporting processes
hat underlie both ToM and other tasks. For example,
he right TPJ is recruited during attentional reorienting
Mitchell, 2008), focused attention and target detection
Geng and Mangun, 2011; Geng and Vossel, 2013; Kubit and
ack,  2014), and in motor response inhibition (Rothmayr
t  al., 2010).
It  remains possible, however, that more speciﬁc sub-
egions of the right TPJ are dedicated to ToM as distinct
rom the other processes just mentioned. For exam-
le, Scholz et al. (2009) found that ToM and exogenous
ttention activated different areas of the right TPJ. Fur-
her,  Rothmayr et al. (2010) found that dorsal aspects of
he  left TPJ might be involved in attentional reorienting
hereas more ventral aspects may  be dedicated to belief-
ttribution. The heterogeneity of these results surrounding
he  role of right versus left TPJ and lack of speciﬁcity
ithin the TPJ in ToM processes may  be due to fMRI
ata acquired at different resolutions, as higher resolu-
ions will reveal more speciﬁc or distinct activations. At
ny  rate, it remains unclear at this point whether the TPJ
r  parts of the TPJ are selective in reasoning about mental
tates or whether there is a common process underlying
oM and attentional orienting that TPJ supports. When
ombined with the evidence described earlier concerning
nconsistent engagement of the TPJ in young children’s ToM
easoning  (Saxe et al., 2009), the absence of clear evidence
f  speciﬁcity for mental state reasoning comes close to
uling  out the view that TPJ constitutes a theory of mind
odule. Of course, modularity theories that do not pro-
ose  TPJ as the ‘ToMM’  would not be challenged in these
ays.  At this point, however, a compelling argument for an
lternative  region as the neural basis for ToMM is yet to be
ade.
.  Simulation theories: shared neural
epresentations
.1. Deﬁnition
Simulation theories (Gallese and Goldman, 1998;
oldman, 2009; Gordon, 1992; Harris, 1992, 2000) pro-
ose  that children (and adults) rely upon direct access to
heir  own psychological states in order to make mental
tate attributions. In reasoning about the minds of others,
hey  project into others’ “shoes” and then read off what
hey  would experience in the relevant situation. Simulation
heories nicely account for the extended developmental
rajectory of ToM reasoning from the early understanding
f false beliefs to later success on more challenging ToM
asks  that require more complex simulation (Carpendale
nd Lewis, 2004; Schwanenﬂugel et al., 1996). They are also
onsistent  with work demonstrating relations between
hildren’s ToM and imaginative ability, which is arguedive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81 71
to  underpin simulation (e.g., Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014;
Taylor  and Carlson, 1997).
3.2.  Criteria
Evidence in favor of simulation accounts would need
to  show that neural systems underlying imaginative or
mental  simulation processes are involved in children’s
ToM reasoning as well as in mapping of the self to oth-
ers.  In addition, children’s experience necessarily plays
a  more central and formative role in this theory than
in  modularity accounts as it is practice in perspective-
taking that is argued to improve simulation skills and thus
ToM  (Chandler, 1973; Harris, 1992; Ozonoff and Miller,
1995). Hence, over development, these neural systems
should become more efﬁcient and automatized. Theoret-
ically, simulation processes should be able to be studied
with neuroimaging techniques to the extent that they rely
on  particular neural networks whose strength of activa-
tion  is related to ToM reasoning based on the similarity of
another  person to the self.
3.3. Evidence
3.3.1. Cortical midline structures
Two  candidate neural systems that may  provide two
routes to simulation through the mapping of self to other
have  been discussed. The ﬁrst system includes the corti-
cal  midline structures (CMS). CMS  may  support evaluative
simulation (Uddin et al., 2007) as these structures have
been  suggested to be involved in intentional, controlled,
evaluative thoughts about self and other. Recruitment of
these  structures could be indicative of simulation processes
because they are involved both in self-perception and per-
spective  taking, at least in adolescents and adults (Pfeifer
et  al., 2009; Saxe et al., 2006; Spreng et al., 2009). For exam-
ple,  Saxe et al. (2006), found activation of CMS  such as MPFC
and  medial precuneus in both a self-reﬂection task and a
belief  reasoning task in adults.
It is important to note that studies investigating the CMS
have  often focused not on others’ mental states, but rather
on  appraisals of the self and others (see Pfeifer et al., 2009).
For  example, rather than directly asking participants to
think  about another’s thoughts (e.g., “where does she think
the  ball is?”), the studies in question tend to ask individuals
what they themselves think about their own  or another’s
traits (e.g., “are you smart?” or “is your friend smart?”).
The relevance of this research, however, is that individuals
seem to activate similar brain areas when evaluating others
and  the self.
Behavioral work shows individuals are more likely to
project  their mental states onto others who are perceived
as  similar than onto those who  are perceived as dissim-
ilar (Ames, 2004a,b). Consistent with those ﬁndings, two
sub-regions of the MPFC, speciﬁcally its ventral (lower) and
dorsal  (upper) aspects, are differentially active in adults
when  thinking about a similar or dissimilar other: the
ventral MPFC tends to be more responsive during men-
talizing when the other person is more similar to the self
whereas the dorsal MPFC is more responsive when making
social  judgments about dissimilar others (Mitchell et al.,
l Cognit72 C.E.V. Mahy et al. / Developmenta
2005, 2006). Further, Saxe and Wexler (2005) found a trend
toward  higher activity in dorsal than ventral MPFC when
participants considered the mental states of individuals
with a foreign compared to a familiar background. This
body  of evidence is supported by a recent meta-analysis
that revealed a spatial gradient for mentalizing in the MPFC
(Denny  et al., 2012) such that self-related judgments were
associated with activity in relatively ventral MPFC, whereas
other-related judgments were associated with activity in
relatively  dorsal MPFC. In sum, sub-regions of the MPFC
differentiate between thinking about the attributes and/or
mental  states of similar versus dissimilar others, suggesting
that  certain regions may  be playing a role both in thinking
about the self and in simulating mental states for similar
others, whereas other regions may  support a different kind
of  processing in order to make judgments about a dissimilar
other  (Harris, 1992; Nichols et al., 1995).
The ﬁndings discussed thus far suggest a potential role
for  the CMS  in online simulation, particularly in adults.
Beyond that, what evidence is there that the CMS plays a
role  in the acquisition of ToM during childhood? Although
adult studies have shown the dorsal/ventral specialization
in MPFC when evaluating similar and dissimilar others,
studies examining this distinction in children are scarce.
However, in a study comparing 9- and 10-year-olds’ and
adults’  evaluations of the self and a familiar, ﬁctional other
(Harry  Potter), activity in the MPFC changed with develop-
ment  (Pfeifer et al., 2007). Speciﬁcally, as in the studies just
discussed, adults recruited dorsal MPFC for reasoning about
Harry  Potter (arguably a fairly dissimilar other), but ven-
tral  MPFC for reasoning about themselves. Like the adults,
children recruited dorsal MPFC for reasoning about Harry
Potter  but, in contrast to adults, they recruited both dor-
sal  and ventral MPFC for reasoning about themselves. This
change  in recruitment of MPFC may  suggest that adults
have  specialized processes for simulating and reasoning
about dissimilar (and similar) others, whereas children’s
brains may  have not yet specialized in this manner.
3.3.2. Mirror neuron system
The second candidate neural substrate for simulation
processes is the putative mirror neuron system (MNS),
which co-activates to the actions, intentions, and emo-
tions  of both the self and others in adults and children
(Dapretto et al., 2006; Iacoboni, 2009; Iacoboni et al., 2005;
Iacoboni  and Dapretto, 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Rizzolatti
and  Craighero, 2004; Waytz and Mitchell, 2011). The MNS
is  a network composed of regions in the inferior frontal
gyrus (pars operculerus and adjacent ventral premotor cor-
tex)  and rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule that are
recruited during the perception and execution of identical
actions (Dapretto et al., 2006; Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006).
This  network may  aid in simulating others’ mental states
by  enabling a direct mapping of others’ actions, goals, and
intentions to the self. MNS  activity is present in both non-
human  and human primates (Gallese, 2007). Because much
of  the work with non-human primates has taken advantage
of  single cell recordings, the MNS  is better characterized at
a  neural level in those species.
Given  that we share this system with our recent pri-
mate ancestors, and that it has been documented in adultsive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81
and  older children (see Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006 for
a  review), it is worth examining evidence for an early
developing MNS  in human infants. The presence of such
a  system would suggest that simulation processes are
operating early in life. Behavioral research suggests that
10–11-month-old infants can parse the structure of human
action,  a prerequisite for understanding intentional action
(Baldwin et al., 2001; Saylor et al., 2007), and that infants
under one year of age appreciate the intentionality in oth-
ers’  actions (e.g., Behne et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 2007; Phillips
et  al., 2002). A mirror system that maps others’ intentional
actions with reference to one’s own  actions could play an
important  role in the acquisition of concepts such as inten-
tion,  desire, and belief via simulation. As with modularity
accounts, it would need to be established that the mirror
neuron system (or the CMS) is involved in very early ToM
reasoning in infants and young children before conclud-
ing  that simulation is central to the acquisition of ToM (as
opposed  to online reasoning in a more mature ToM).
Studies using EEG technology may  help to identify MNS
function in infants. Mu  rhythm, an electrical signal around
10  Hz generated by motor areas at rest, is suppressed both
during  motor execution and action observation in adults
(Glenberg, 2011). Infant EEG mu rhythm is a possible can-
didate  for an early form of the mirror neuron system, as
desynchronization of mu  rhythm occurs during an infant’s
own  movement as well as the observation of another’s
movement (Marshall et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2009,
2010). Research on infant mu  rhythm is still in its early
stages and so we  cannot be fully conﬁdent that mu rhythm
desynchronization represents a mirroring process related
to  the MNS. It will be important to determine whether mu
rhythm  response changes with development, and whether
it  performs the same function as the MNS, before making
the  claim that it supports simulation theory (Marshall and
Meltzoff,  2011).
In  sum, there are at least two  neural systems that could
potentially support ToM reasoning through the simulation
of  others’ mental states. Additional support for the role of
CMS  and the MNS  in ToM reasoning comes from research
indicating that individuals with autism show reduced acti-
vation  of these networks in social cognition tasks compared
to  typically developing controls (Dapretto et al., 2006).
Because these individuals have clear deﬁcits in ToM, the
ﬁndings  are consistent with the view that these two  sys-
tems  play a role in successful mentalizing (Dapretto et al.,
2006;  Pfeifer et al., 2011, 2013; Uddin et al., 2007). It is
worth  noting, however, that abnormalities in MNS  and CMS
functioning in individuals with autism may  be related to
other  difﬁculties that this population experiences, such as
linguistic  or cognitive deﬁcits, and may  not be the sole rea-
son  for their difﬁculty in understanding the minds of others
via  simulation (or any other process for that matter).
4. Executive accounts: role of inhibition
4.1. DeﬁnitionExecutive accounts (e.g., Carlson et al., 2014; Carlson
and Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998; Moses, 2001; Moses
and Tahiroglu, 2010; Russell, 1997) posit that children’s
l Cognit
d
p
i
r
p
(
d
t
o
E
r
w
(
n
t
e
p
c
4
i
t
b
H
t
t
T
T
f
s
e
n
i
i
T
i
a
f
e
t
s
t
C
a
i
c
D
e
c
l
b
t
a
i
e
e
2C.E.V. Mahy et al. / Developmenta
ifﬁculties reasoning about mental states stem at least in
art  from challenges in inhibiting one’s own perspective
n order to generate a different one, and/or in holding the
elevant  perspectives in working memory. These accounts
ostulate that developments in executive functioning
EF) contribute markedly to age related changes in ToM
uring the preschool years, and perhaps beyond. At least
wo  possible stances might be taken regarding the role
f  EF in ToM reasoning. One strong stance might be that
F  is sufﬁcient for ToM, meaning that EF can support ToM
easoning in the absence of additional processes. A second,
eaker stance might be that EF is not sufﬁcient for ToM
that  is, it relies on other processes as well) but that it is
onetheless necessary for ToM. This weaker stance itself
akes  two forms according to which EF is necessary for
ither  (a) the expression of ToM concepts in online task
erformance or (b) the emergence or acquisition of ToM
oncepts themselves (Moses, 2001).
.2. Criteria
Executive accounts are supported by a plethora of ﬁnd-
ngs  demonstrating strong relations between EF and ToM
hat  hold up when age, verbal ability, and other possi-
le  confounding variables are controlled (see Devine and
ughes,  in press, for a recent meta-analysis). To the extent
hat  EF contributes to ToM reasoning and its development,
he brain regions that support EF should be engaged during
oM  tasks. Further, evidence that brain regions involved in
oM  and EF are proximal or structurally connected, and
unctionally connected during ToM reasoning, would be
upportive of such accounts. In principle, neuroimaging
vidence should be informative as connectivity between
eural regions supporting EF and ToM can be easily exam-
ned  using MRI.
To  support the stance that EF is sufﬁcient for mentaliz-
ng, ToM tasks should activate EF areas but not additional
oM-speciﬁc brain regions. To support the stance that EF
s  necessary for ToM, ToM tasks should always activate EF
reas  but could also activate ToM speciﬁc regions. In the
ollowing section, we review the existing neuroimaging
vidence for these two viewpoints.
We also focus on one particular EF, inhibitory con-
rol, for several reasons: (1) inhibitory control has been
uggested as a key process in ToM development during
he  preschool years (e.g., Carlson et al., 1998, 2002, 2004;
arlson and Moses, 2001; Russell, 1997), (2) behavioral
nd neuropsychological research with adults shows that
nhibition plays a necessary but not sufﬁcient role in
ertain ToM computations (see Apperly et al., 2004;
umontheil et al., 2010; Fanning et al., 2012; Keysar
t al., 2003; Samson, 2009; Stone et al., 1998 for critical
omplementary perspectives from the neuropsychology
iterature), and (3) the neural correlates of inhibition have
een  clearly mapped in the brain. For example, activity in
he  bilateral ventral prefrontal cortex, right parietal lobe,
nd  right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex increases during
nhibition tasks in both children and adults (e.g., Aron
t  al., 2004; Bunge et al., 2002; Casey et al., 1997; Durston
t  al., 2002; Fassbender et al., 2006; Levy and Wagner,
011; Yamaguchi et al., 2008).ive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81 73
4.3. Evidence
A  ﬁrst line of relevant evidence comes from studies
with adults comparing neural activation on ToM tasks to
that  on inhibition tasks. For example, Van der Meer et al.
(2011)  found that both a high inhibition false-belief task
and  a stop-signal inhibition task recruited bilateral infe-
rior  frontal gyrus, possibly reﬂecting a common inhibitory
control mechanism. In addition, Rothmayr et al. (2010)
found that inhibitory control and false belief reasoning
tasks recruit some similar neural regions (right superior
and medial frontal gyrus, right middle temporal gyrus,
bilateral middle frontal gyrus, and bilateral TPJ). Challeng-
ing  the position that EF is sufﬁcient for ToM, however,
Rothmayr et al. also found that inhibition and false belief
tasks  recruited some distinct neural regions (left superior
and  medial frontal gyrus, left inferior, middle, and superior
frontal gyrus, left middle temporal gyrus, left TPJ, bilateral
precuneus, and bilateral thalamus).
Nonetheless, studies such as these are not well suited
to  uncovering either the unique contribution of inhibition
to  mentalizing or the distinct neural signatures of the two
abilities  because the tasks differ in so many other ways such
as  verbal demands, number of trials, and task structure.
Clearly, more stringent controls are necessary.
A second line of evidence attempts to provide such
control by comparing neural underpinnings of tasks assess-
ing  understanding of mental representations (such as false
beliefs)  with those assessing understanding of non-mental
representations (such as “false” photographs and “false”
signs).  For example, Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) found that
false  belief stories activated bilateral TPJ in adults to a
much  greater extent than stories that involved false pho-
tographs. This was taken as evidence that ToM recruits
neural regions over and above those involved in inhibition
as  both false belief and false photograph conditions appear
to  pose identical demands on inhibitory control, only differ-
ing  in their demands on mentalizing (although see Sabbagh
et  al., 2006). Further supporting a distinction between the
neural  systems supporting ToM and EF is a study showing
that  the right TPJ was speciﬁcally associated with process-
ing  mental states such as false beliefs, whereas the left TPJ
was  also activated by reasoning about false signs (Perner
et  al., 2006). Similar to Saxe and Kanwisher’s (2003) study,
the  false belief and false sign conditions were designed to
be  identical in their demand on inhibition, yet right TPJ
additionally supported false belief reasoning, suggesting
that EF is not sufﬁcient for mental state reasoning.
A third line of evidence attempts to uncover common
and unique neural underpinnings by manipulating the
belief  task itself. For example, in the Van der Meer et al.
(2011) study discussed earlier two  false belief conditions
were contrasted, one requiring false belief reasoning with-
out  prior knowledge of the object’s location (low inhibition
condition) and one requiring false belief reasoning with
prior  knowledge of that location (high inhibition condi-
tion).  Belief reasoning in the high inhibition compared to
the  low inhibition condition more heavily recruited areas
associated with cognitive control or conﬂict monitoring
such as bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, dMPFC, and insula.
Similarly, Hartwright et al. (2012) manipulated whether
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the belief to be processed was true (low inhibition) or
false  (high inhibition). Across conditions they found mod-
ulated  brain activity in the ToM network in adults (e.g.,
bilateral TPJ) but also in executive control regions (e.g., ven-
trolateral  PFC). These ﬁndings provide evidence suggesting
that  EF is necessary for false belief reasoning but not true
belief  reasoning and that different neural regions support-
ing  executive control may  be recruited for different aspects
of  ToM reasoning (i.e., for true and false beliefs).
Taken together, current evidence suggests that although
EF  (or at least inhibitory processes) is involved in many
types of ToM reasoning (particularly when the task requires
false  belief reasoning), there are distinct neural correlates
of  ToM reasoning that do not involve EF brain areas. Adult
neuroimaging evidence thus seems to rule out the ‘strong’
account of EF as sufﬁcient for ToM. However, evidence for
the  weaker ‘EF as necessary for ToM’ viewpoint is sup-
ported by most of the ﬁndings showing that neural regions
supporting inhibition are often involved in false belief rea-
soning.
Nonetheless, as is true for the theoretical accounts dis-
cussed  earlier, the evidence is limited in what it can tell
us  about the role of EF in ToM acquisition during child-
hood. To our knowledge, there is only one neuroimaging
study examining the EF and ToM relation in children.
Sabbagh et al. (2009) examined relations between ToM
and  preschoolers’ resting alpha (6–9 Hz), an EEG waveform
thought to reﬂect functional, domain-general, matura-
tional changes in brain development (Thatcher, 1992).
Resting EEG alpha estimates in dorsomedial PFC and TPJ
were  positively associated with individual differences in
false  belief understanding independent of variability in age
and  performance on EF tasks. The ﬁndings suggest that EF
is  not sufﬁcient for ToM early in development, although it
leaves  open the question of whether EF is necessary for,
or  facilitative of, the expression of ToM earlier in devel-
opment and throughout the lifespan (see Apperly et al.,
2009;  Samson et al., 2004). Examining whether brain func-
tioning  during EF tasks explains unique variance in ToM
performance beyond age and verbal intelligence would be
a  positive next step.
Developmental studies examining the neural basis of
EF  and ToM in young children will be critical in help-
ing tease apart the expression and emergence accounts of
the  role of EF in ToM. As described earlier, the expression
account suggests that executive processes are necessary for
online  performance on ToM tasks whereas the emergence
account suggests that ToM concepts cannot be formed
without a certain level of executive ability (Moses, 2001). If
a  mature pattern of recruitment of ToM neural regions but
not  EF regions is apparent, and yet behavioral ToM per-
formance is immature, this would support the expression
account. In contrast, if the functional development of brain
regions  associated with ToM lagged behind development
of EF regions, this would be consistent with the emergence
account.
Other analytic techniques may  continue to help to
identify common circuitry underlying EF and ToM. In
particular, a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005)
requires that a particular voxel be signiﬁcantly activated
above the selected statistical threshold in all conditions ofive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81
interest.  Enacting this approach would at least allow for
the  examination of which systems may  be involved in both
EF  and ToM processing, as demonstrated by Rothmayr
et al. (2010). Further, exploring the connectivity among
regions during different tasks using psychophysiological
interaction (PPI) analysis (e.g., Friston et al., 1997) may  be
helpful  in revealing similarities and differences between
ToM and EF processing. For example, during mental state
tasks  (but not executive, non-mentalizing conditions)
there should be connections between bilateral inferior
frontal gyrus, the cortical midline structures, and TPJ.
Parametric modulation (see Durston and Casey, 2006) is
yet  another technique that may  be helpful in disentangling
the role of EF in ToM by allowing for the manipulation of
executive demands from low to high in a ToM task (also
see  Van der Meer et al., 2011), which would potentially
reveal ToM regions that are responsive to EF demands.
To sum up, some neural evidence supports executive
accounts of ToM development. However, while there is
overlap  between regions that support ToM and EF, it is
once  again less clear what role these areas play in acqui-
sition of ToM concepts. In line with behavioral ﬁndings, the
neural  evidence suggests that EF is not sufﬁcient for ToM
but  rather that EF may  be necessary for some types of ToM
reasoning.
5.  Theory theory: conceptual change
5.1. Deﬁnition
Theory theory (Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik and Wellman,
1994, 2012) postulates that knowledge about the mind
resides in domain-speciﬁc theory-like structures and that
radical  conceptual changes drive the development of chil-
dren’s  naïve mental state understanding. According to
this  account, children collect evidence about the relation
between mental states and action, much as a scientist
collects data to inform theory. To the extent that such
evidence is inconsistent with children’s current theory of
mind,  conceptual change will eventually occur. This the-
oretical  stance suggests that relatively abstract theorizing
about data gleaned from the social world forms a system of
mental  concepts; therefore, the child and his or her experi-
ences  play an active role in concept formation (e.g., Cutting
and  Dunn, 1999; Hughes and Leekham, 2004; Jenkins and
Astington, 1996; Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014; Pears and
Moses,  2003).
5.2.  Criteria
In  the developmental psychology literature, it has often
been  suggested that theory theory provides the best account
of  existing developmental data, notably progressions in
children’s  appreciation of simpler to more complex men-
tal  state concepts (Gopnik and Wellman, 1994; Wellman
et  al., 2001; Moses, 2001) There is also ample behav-
ioral evidence that children make conceptual advances
in mental state understanding in response to experience
(e.g., Astington and Baird, 2005; Jenkins and Astington,
1996; Lohmann and Tomasello, 2003; Ruffman et al., 2002;
Slaughter and Gopnik, 1996).
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Theory theory could be supported by evidence of (a)
eural structures or networks supporting domain-speciﬁc
onceptual structures and (b) age-related neural changes
ssociated with relevant conceptual changes. The central
rediction of theory theory, that conceptual change in
esponse to experience drives the development of ToM, is
hallenging  to assess, however, because it is not entirely
lear how conceptual change is reﬂected in the brain. As a
esult,  theory theory may  be the most challenging account
o  evaluate with neuroimaging evidence.
.3. Evidence
With respect to knowledge about the mind residing in
omain-speciﬁc structures, much of the evidence for mod-
larity  theories becomes relevant. For example, evidence
uggesting that TPJ speciﬁcally supports ToM is consis-
ent  with theory theory as well as modularity accounts.
oreover, the increasing developmental selectivity of the
PJ  to ToM concepts that is problematic for modular-
ty accounts is not damaging to theory theory, in that
ncreasing selectivity may  reﬂect conceptual change with
dvancing age. In addition, while lack of selectivity of
rain  regions (such as the TPJ) is problematic for mod-
larity theories (because modularity theories postulate
edicated neural architecture), it is not a strike against the-
ry  theory, which is neutral with respect to whether the
ame  neural system could be recruited for different pur-
oses.
With  respect to the role of radical conceptual change in
oM  development, the TPJ may  be implicated. For exam-
le,  recent research with adults suggests that the TPJ may
lay  a role in disengaging from one’s internal, current self-
erspective to attend to an external, other’s point of view
Corbetta et al., 2008) – a process that is key to most
oM tasks. Further, disruption of TPJ activity by seizures or
lectrical  stimulation results in hallucinatory mispercep-
ions surrounding one’s body and the environment (see
enggenhager et al., 2007; Arzy et al., 2006), again sug-
esting that the TPJ plays a role internal versus external
epresentations. If TPJ is indeed involved in updating one’s
nternal  expectations versus external reality, it is a reason-
ble  hypothesis that this brain region may  play a role in
riving  conceptual understanding, as children must inte-
rate  information from their external environment with
heir  internal states in order to update their hypothe-
es.
Relevant to this hypothesis are recent developmental
tudies using a load force adjustment paradigm (Sabbagh,
011; Sabbagh et al., 2010), a task that requires individuals
o  adapt their lifting behavior to smoothly lift an unexpect-
dly  heavy object. The load force adjustment task measures
ow  efﬁciently children adapt their conception of an
bject’s weight in response to empirical evidence that con-
icts  with an initial hypothesis. Importantly, an earlier fMRI
tudy  with adults found that the rTPJ was engaged during
 load force adjustment task suggesting that it is involved
n  the process of updating prior hypotheses about weight
oward more accurate predictions (Jenmalm et al., 2006),
imilar  to how one would update hypotheses for ToM
ccording to theory theory. Consistent with theory theory,ive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81 75
Sabbagh  et al. found that ToM reasoning was related to 3-
and  4-year-old children’s ability in load force adjustment,
arguably because both ToM and load force adjust-
ment require change to existing conceptual structures in
response  to experience. Further, children’s resting EEG
alpha  in TPJ was related to both superior ToM reasoning
and load force adjustment, suggesting that common neural
development associated with conceptual change may  be
driving  performance on these two  tasks (Sabbagh, 2011).
Within  the theory theory tradition, much attention
has been paid to the different developmental trajecto-
ries of understanding desires (a relatively early developing
concept) and beliefs (a relatively later developing con-
cept;  Wellman and Liu, 2004). It is possible that belief
understanding develops out of and is supported by desire
understanding. If so, belief and desire reasoning may  share
some  underlying neural correlates but belief reasoning
should recruit additional neural structures. Consistent with
this  possibility, adult reasoning about desires and beliefs in
an  ERP study had both common and unique neural under-
pinnings. Reasoning about both beliefs and desires was
associated with a positive late slow wave with a midfrontal
scalp distribution, whereas only reasoning about beliefs
showed an additional positive late slow wave with a right-
posterior scalp distribution (Liu et al., 2009). This pattern
was  replicated by Bowman et al. (2012) in 7–8-year-old
children. Therefore, it seems plausible that early desire rea-
soning  relies on neural regions and perhaps conceptual
structures that in part support later belief understand-
ing.
A potential approach to gaining further traction on ToM
theory  change would be to examine whether ToM relevant
brain  structures/systems such as the CMS, MNS, and TPJ
show  developmental changes associated with advancing
ToM understanding. Perhaps the system that changes the
most  over the early childhood years or shows evidence of
connectivity changes is the system that plays a role in driv-
ing  conceptual change. Similarly, changes in white matter
connectivity, which are known to be reﬁned by experience
(Keller and Just, 2009; Mabbott et al., 2006; Nagy et al.,
2004),  could potentially be investigated as correlates of
children’s experientially driven conceptual advances. It is
interesting  to note that while developmental changes in
TPJ  selectivity are problematic for modularity theories, they
are  not problematic for theory theory, as one would expect
changes in neural structures across childhood in response
to  theory revision and conceptual advances in ToM under-
standing.
Because only a few studies address the question of
what conceptual change in ToM might look like at the
neural level, researchers may draw inspiration from other
neuroimaging ﬁelds in which the relation between con-
ceptual and neural change has been more fully mapped.
One such case involves the differential neural activations
that subserve implicit and explicit memory. Event-related
potentials have shown different spatiotemporal compo-
nents  of explicit and implicit memory retrieval (e.g., Paller
et  al., 2003; Rugg et al., 1998). In addition, Schott et al.
(2005) found that implicit memory retrieval relied on pre-
frontal,  fusiform, and extrastriate regions whereas explicit
memory retrieval recruited posterior cingulate, precuneus,
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and inferior parietal lobule. This example may  be particu-
larly  relevant to theory theory in that the ﬂedgling forms
of  mentalizing evident in infancy and very early childhood
have  been argued to represent an implicit ToM, whereas
more verbal forms of ToM evident in preschoolers’ false
belief  performance may  represent an explicit ToM (e.g.,
Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009; Clements and Perner, 1994;
Clements et al., 2000; Low and Perner, 2012; Thoermer
et al., 2012; Ruffman et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2012). To
the  extent that this is so, implicit and explicit processes
supporting ToM may  rely on partially independent brain
networks just as implicit and explicit memory processes
do.  Further, the change from implicit to explicit ToM may
occur  because of conceptual advances in the understanding
of mental state concepts. Consistent with that possibil-
ity, Wellman et al. (2008) showed that infants’ attention
to  intentional action was predictive of their ToM under-
standing as preschoolers, suggesting a link from implicit
to  explicit understanding. Clearly, however, for neural
evidence to support theory theory we would need to
determine (a) whether different neural signatures indeed
underlie implicit versus explicit ToM, and (b) whether neu-
ral  changes occur during the transition from implicit to
explicit  ToM understanding, speciﬁcally ones which take
the  form of building connections between brain regions
that  support these two types of ToM reasoning.
In assessing the neural basis of theory change it would
also be worth examining the role of the default mode
network, a coordinated network that is activated by task-
independent introspection or self-referential thought (e.g.,
Fair  et al., 2008; Sheline et al., 2009) and is especially
active during high-level social cognitive tasks (Harrison
et  al., 2008). This network involves several neural regions
overlapping with those discussed in this review, such
as  MPFC, medial precuneus/posterior cingulate, and TPJ
(Supekar  et al., 2010). Functional connectivity in the default
mode  network is not yet fully mature in childhood (7–9-
year-old); its regions only become fully connected into a
cohesive  network by early adulthood (Fair et al., 2008), con-
sistent  with predictions of theory theory that conceptual
change follows an extended trajectory over development.
We  suggest that a network-wide approach may  be the
optimal way to examine the predictions of theory theory,
as  conceptual changes plausibly involve a broader set of
regions  and processes compared to those involved in the
other  theories that tend to target more speciﬁc regions or
networks  associated with modular ToM processing, simu-
lation,  or executive processes.
To summarize, the neural evidence for theory change
in  ToM is fairly sparse, although recent work is begin-
ning to address this theory (Bowman et al., 2012; Sabbagh,
2011). Clearly, in future work very young children will need
to  be assessed to determine whether a particular neural
system supports advances in mental state understanding
through hypothesis testing. Further, the development of
these  neural systems should correlate with behavioral per-
formance  on ToM tasks. Research of this kind would ideally
take  a longitudinal approach starting with young children
who  do not yet possess the relevant ToM concepts and
following them through the transition to concept acqui-
sition.ive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81
6.  Conclusions
6.1. Challenges
Our review illustrates that social-cognitive neuro-
science research has contributed importantly to our
understanding of the neural systems that support ToM.
Each  of the theories discussed is supported by some neu-
ral  evidence, yet each is also called into question by other
evidence or left open to question in the absence of suf-
ﬁcient evidence. Moving forward, different tactics may
need  to be utilized to better interrogate the theories. As
we  see it, at least ﬁve issues currently pose challenges to
research  examining the neural evidence for theories of ToM
acquisition. Although these challenges may  seem daunt-
ing,  we  believe that advances in current technologies and
methodologies, as well as better theoretical articulation of
core  conceptual issues, may  result in signiﬁcant forward
progress.
A  ﬁrst difﬁculty is that theories of ToM acquisition need
to  be sharpened so that neuroimaging research can better
distinguish among them rather than simply amass evi-
dence  in support of them. Part of the problem is that the
theories are not necessarily entirely mutually exclusive.
For example, Leslie et al.’s modularity account explicitly
includes an ancillary executive component (the selection
processor). Similarly, there is no reason in principle that
simulation theory or theory theory could not have at least
some  modular basis that provides input into the more
ﬂexible, general-purpose mechanisms postulated by these
theories.  In addition, there is no reason why  simulation
could not be a useful tool for a child theoretician (just as
it  is for a scientiﬁc theoretician). Finally, developments in
executive  function could, and likely do, play a role in facil-
itating  more accurate simulation and more sophisticated
theory building. And yet the theories are sufﬁciently vague
on  these points that it is often difﬁcult to assess the extent
to  which evidence in support of one theory is damaging to
the  other theories. Until the theories are better articulated
in  these and related ways neural evidence is unlikely to
fully  discriminate among them (and, of course, the same is
true  for behavioral evidence).
A second, related challenge is that several of the pro-
posed mechanisms behind ToM acquisition are difﬁcult to
articulate  sufﬁciently to be easily tested at the neural level.
For  example, conceptual change, the central mechanism
in theory theory, is a rather abstract construct that could
take  many forms at both the behavioral and neural levels
(although see Gopnik and Wellman, 2012, for an attempt
to  translate theory change into more precise computa-
tional form). Similarly, simulation is difﬁcult to deﬁne, as
there  are several routes by which the contents of another’s
mind can be approximated. Moreover, many questions
remain concerning simulation such as the extent to which
it  is automatic/implicit or conscious/explicit. Such distinc-
tions  have implications for how simulation is measured.
In  contrast, with respect to modularity theory, progress
in  deﬁning and quantifying neural selectivity (Saxe, 2010;
Saxe  et al., 2009), offers an encouraging example of how
complex neural processes can be measured and used to test
a  theory. If we  could similarly quantify conceptual change
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r simulation in terms of expected differences in brain acti-
ation  or increasing selectivity of neural structures, we
ould  be better able to acquire evidence to support or
efute  the relevant theories.
A  third challenge is addressing task heterogeneity
ithin the ToM literature. Across the studies reviewed
ere, ToM paradigms varied enormously, although most
ocused  on cognitive ToM tasks rather than affective ones.
t  least some of the differences and inconsistencies across
tudies  could well be accounted for by varying task struc-
ures  and task demands, as well as by varying conceptual
ontent. Hence, the implications of these imaging studies
or  theories of ToM acquisition are not always straightfor-
ard. The same challenge arises from heterogeneity in age
roups  studied and heterogeneity in neuroimaging meth-
ds  and analyses.
A  fourth challenge is how to conceptualize maturity of
he  neural networks involved in ToM processing. Brain
egions involved in ToM reasoning continue to develop
nto adolescence, as does behavioral ToM performance
Dumontheil et al., 2010), so it is important to clarify
hat criteria are being used to consider neural process-
ng  as ‘mature’ (see Pfeifer and Allen, 2012). For example,
ne could deﬁne maturity in terms of neural functioning
hat supports successful behavioral performance. So, even
hough  5-year-olds may  not have fully developed brain
egions in the ToM network, the neural processes that
llow  them to pass simple false belief tasks may  be con-
idered ‘mature’. Alternately, maturity may  be deﬁned by
he  speed or efﬁciency of the neural systems that support
oM,  in which case the neural systems underlying false
elief  understanding would not be considered mature until
uch  later. Within the executive account, this issue is par-
icularly  salient as maturity of EF is predicted to inﬂuence
oM maturity. Here again, we know that (neurally as well as
ehaviorally)  EF develops into early adulthood (Luna et al.,
010).  However, the expression account predicts that at
 certain level of EF, ToM should no longer be hindered by
xecutive  difﬁculties with the task, thereby enabling it to be
xpressed.  As a result, it is just as important to deﬁne what
ounts  as neurally mature EF for a particular purpose as it is
o  deﬁne neurally mature ToM for that purpose. Resolving
his  issue ideally would produce clear and consistent deﬁ-
itions  of maturity that can be used in future neuroimaging
tudies. Moreover, what counts as maturity would need to
e  established separately for different ToM concepts, which
f  course each have their own developmental trajectories.
A  ﬁnal challenge is that ToM neuroimaging research
onsists predominantly of studies of online ToM process-
ng  in adults, while only a fraction of studies examine how
oM  is acquired during development. Adult studies are cer-
ainly  important in understanding how the fully developed
orm  of ToM is characterized at the neural level, but until
e  have a clear developmental picture of how neural sys-
ems  support the acquisition of ToM we will not be able
o  strongly test the different theoretical stances behind
cquisition. There are two problems. First, the acquisition
f  more nuanced concepts by “experts” may  be quite differ-
nt  from acquisition of initial basic concepts by “novices”.
econd, and more generally, it is not clear how the neu-
al  underpinnings of online ToM processing relate to theive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81 77
neural  underpinnings of ToM acquisition. For example, if
it  is a matter of the magnitude of neural activation, with
higher levels indicating mature processing and lower levels
indicating ToM acquisition in progress (or vice versa), then
acquisition and online processing may  be viewed as a con-
tinuum  in terms of neural activation. If these two  modes
of  activation rely on different brain regions or systems,
however, this would indicate that acquisition and online
processing are relatively independent.
Studies attempting to measure the neural correlates
of conceptual change would do well to focus on children
who are on the cusp of acquiring the relevant ToM con-
cept,  and to monitor their transition to successful concept
acquisition. Fortunately, technological and methodologi-
cal advances increasingly allow very young children to be
scanned  while minimizing data loss (e.g., Cantlon et al.,
2006;  Gaffrey et al., 2011; Raschle et al., 2012), providing
the opportunity to ﬁnally examine ToM acquisition as it
unfolds.  That said, successfully neuroimaging young chil-
dren  is not without challenges. For example, in contrast to
behavioral measures of ToM such as false belief tasks that
rely  on a very small number of trials, imaging studies typ-
ically  demand high repetition of trials. Keeping children
attentive with engaging and varied tasks is clearly neces-
sary  but not always easy.
6.2.  Future directions
Having  now identiﬁed some of the major challenges
that the ﬁeld needs to address, we  next suggest promis-
ing future directions that may  help to clarify the neural
basis of ToM acquisition. First, we know that both structural
and  functional changes occur in neural regions associ-
ated with social cognitive development. For example, Mills
et  al. (2012) found that gray matter and cortical thickness
decrease from childhood into early adulthood in mentaliz-
ing  regions such as MPFC and TPJ, and that the surface areas
of  these regions peak in early or pre-adolescence before
decreasing in the early twenties. These structural changes
may  have implications for development of mentalizing
functions. Functionally, there are hints of declines in MPFC
activation during mentalizing from early adolescence to
adulthood  (Gunther Moor et al., 2012) as well as a potential
shift  from anterior to posterior brain regions supporting
mentalizing (e.g., Blakemore, 2012; Burnett et al., 2009;
Gunther Moor et al., 2012). Yet, few studies have simul-
taneously examined structural and functional changes in
brain  areas associated with ToM development (see Gunther
Moor  et al., 2012) and fewer still have investigated young
children. Doing so will be an important next step in this
area  of research.
Second, training and/or microgenetic studies investi-
gating neural changes that accompany ToM development
would greatly add to our knowledge. For example, what
is  the impact of training EF, simulation, or ToM reasoning
itself on the neural regions associated with mentalizing?
This is perhaps one of the most promising avenues of
work  for differentiating among theories, as the theories
predict that different types of training will be effective
and should generate distinctive neural changes in some
of  the brain regions discussed earlier. Interestingly, using
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neuroimaging techniques to examine the impact of ToM
training on the neural structures of individuals with autism
is  already underway (Bolte et al., 2006). On a practical note,
understanding what processes and neural regions are driv-
ing  ToM development has implications for intervention and
training  programs. For example, children’s simulation or
executive  abilities may  be able to be trained in order to
improve ToM, whereas, if neural evidence suggests that
an  early developed module is responsible for ToM reason-
ing  then training these abilities later in childhood may  be
unproductive.
Finally,  using TMS  to examine the brain areas that are
associated with simulation, conceptual advances, or EF may
illuminate  the role these processes play in ToM develop-
ment (e.g., Young et al., 2010b). Disrupting key ToM regions
may  result in immature behavioral performance, mak-
ing  adults’ performance child-like on certain ToM tasks,
and  so helping to establish the neural regions responsi-
ble for early ToM development. In addition, studies that
temporarily disrupt neural regions associated with a cer-
tain  type of processing (whether simulation, executive, or
conceptual)  may  indicate whether these processes work
independently or simultaneously to contribute to mental-
izing.  For example, disrupting the rTPJ may  result in poorer
ToM  performance, but are there other neural regions such
as  MPFC or pSTS that account for individual differences in
ToM  performance independent of the rTPJ? In other words,
can  one succeed on ToM tasks without the TPJ?
6.3. Conclusion
The current state of neuroimaging research has impor-
tant implications for theories of ToM acquisition. Although
current evidence does not allow us to fully distinguish
among theories, signiﬁcant advances have been made in
examining  each theory. First, the lack of consistency of
recruitment of the TPJ across development and lack of TPJ
speciﬁcity challenges the idea that TPJ could be a dedicated
ToMM of the kind proposed in certain strict varieties of
modularity theory (Leslie et al., 2004). Second, both CMS
and  MNS  have been identiﬁed as plausible candidate mech-
anisms  for simulation theories, although it is unclear how
these  systems contribute to ToM acquisition. Third, evi-
dence  for the role of executive processes in ToM suggests
that  inhibition is necessary, but not sufﬁcient for ToM pro-
cessing,  as several neural regions seem to contribute to
mentalizing in addition to regions supporting inhibitory
processing. Finally, evidence that the TPJ may  be involved
in  resolving discrepancies between internal expectations
and external reality suggests that TPJ may  play a role in
theory  revision and conceptual change.
It is our hope that with further advances in the ﬁeld such
as  the ability to conduct structural and functional MRI  with
even  younger children, it will become easier to tease the-
ories  of ToM acquisition apart with neural evidence. The
future  directions we have outlined represent promising
avenues of research that should generate a richer appre-
ciation of how ToM develops in the brain, building upon
past  work that has described where the neural substrates
of  ToM are in the brain. We  hope this review illustrates
key neural regions and processes that might play a role inive Neuroscience 9 (2014) 68–81
ToM  development and how advances in neuroimaging may
offer  fruitful ways in which to examine the development
of ToM and, as a result, to address the theories behind its
acquisition.
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